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A commentary on
Is the frontal lobe involved in conscious perception?
by Safavi, S., Kapoor, V., Logothetis, N. K., and Panagiotaropoulos, T. I. (2014). Front. Psychol.
5:1063. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01063
Like any other field, the field of consciousness research benefits from a careful distinction between
the concepts involved. An example is the distinction between the state of being conscious (e.g.,
whether someone is awake) and the contents of consciousness (e.g., whether someone perceives a
dress as white or blue). A similar type of distinction can contribute to the resolution of a debate
regarding the role of the frontal cortex in conscious perception. In a recent publication Safavi
et al. (2014) responded to conclusions drawn in a study regarding the role of frontal cortex in
conscious perception. This study, by Frässle et al. (2014), employed binocular rivalry to show that
well-established frontal BOLD correlates of perceptual switches (Lumer et al., 1998; Sterzer and
Kleinschmidt, 2007) were strongly diminished when participants passively viewed these switches
rather than reporting them. Frässle and co-workers (among whom the present paper’s first author)
concluded: “frontal areas are associated with active report and introspection rather than with rivalry
per se.” This statement is a bit audacious, as it rules out any role of frontal areas in rivalry other
than their role in reporting perception. As such, Safavi and co-workers draw into question this
conclusion, based on evidence indicating that neural activity in frontal areas, in particular in the
lateral prefrontal cortex, reflects the contents of consciousness in paradigms that do not involve
active report.
Here we aim to bring these two positions closer together by making an explicit distinction
between neural activity that reflects the content of consciousness, and neural activity that brings
about changes in consciousness during perceptual bistability. Safavi et al. (2014) bring forward a
variety of studies linking frontal lobe function to the content of consciousness (Imamoglu et al.,
2012; Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2012). Frässle and colleagues, in turn, are specifically concerned
with fMRI BOLD responses that are time-locked to perceptual switches, not to periods when
the contents of consciousness are stable. Recent debate has focused on the question what brings
about this switch-related BOLD signal during bi-stable perception, with a central question being
whether it reflects a neural initiation of these switches or an indirect consequence (Sterzer et al.,
2009; Knapen et al., 2011; Weilnhammer et al., 2013; Frässle et al., 2014). Frässle and colleagues’
conclusions should be understood in the context of this question. Specifically, the conclusions
promote the idea that the frontal response observed during binocular rivalry reflects an indirect
consequence of perceptual switches, as it is associated with reporting them. In other words, while
we do not disagree with Safavi et al.’s arguments regarding a potential role of frontal cortex
in representing the contents of conscious perception, and while we recognize that Frässle and
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colleagues perhaps have oversimplified the dichotomy between
report-related and initiation-related functions, these concerns
should not obscure Frässle et al.’s point with regard to frontal
cortex’ involvement in perceptual switches during bi-stable
perception.
As a further point, the “binocular flash suppression” paradigm
that providesmuch of the empirical basis of Safavi and colleagues’
argument, manipulates the content of awareness while explicitly
avoiding spontaneous switches in perception. This provides a
further indication that Frässle et al.’s claims regarding perceptual
switches can exist side-by-side with Safavi et al.’s claims regarding
stable perception. Indeed, the next paragraph will summarize
evidence that frontal involvement in coding the contents of
consciousness does not imply frontal involvement in perceptual
switches.
Whereas the anatomical distribution of activity that reflects
the content of consciousness during bi-stable perception depends
on the stimulus employed (Logothetis and Schall, 1989; Leopold
and Logothetis, 1996; Tong et al., 1998; Andrews et al., 2002;
Parker et al., 2002), the locus of fMRI BOLD concomitants of
perceptual switches is remarkably constant across distinct forms
of perceptual bistability (Sterzer and Kleinschmidt, 2007; Knapen
et al., 2011; Frässle et al., 2014). Evidence from studies on the
peripheral nervous system with pupillometry points to a similar
distinction between mechanisms involved in stable vs. instable
perception. The eye’s pupil can track the perceptual content of
consciousness when this content changes in terms of luminance
or contrast: the pupil constricts when a bright, high-contrast
percept is experienced and dilates when a dark, low-contrast
percept is experienced (Naber et al., 2011). This directionality
is unrelated to a different pupillary response: a brief pupil
dilation around the time of a perceptual switch, independent
of luminance or contrast change (Einhäuser et al., 2008; Hupé
et al., 2009; Naber et al., 2011). The phenomenological difference
between these pupil responses reflects distinct neural origins: the
pupil’s reflection of perceptual content (i.e., contrast/luminance)
is driven by higher-level cortical visual areas (Barbur et al.,
1992, 1998; Naber and Nakayama, 2013) while pupil responses
during perceptual switches are the result of sympathetic arousal
(Bradshaw, 1967; Einhäuser et al., 2008; Preuschoff et al., 2011;
Laeng et al., 2012; Stoll et al., 2013). Pupillary dynamics during
rivalry hence underscore the distinction between processes that
reflect the content of consciousness and processes involved in
changes in this content.
As a final remark we would like to stress, as others have
(Safavi et al., 2014; Zaretskaya and Narinyan, 2014) that several
frontal areas still showed switch-related BOLD activity in Frässle
et al.’s condition without active report. In particular, the right
superior frontal gyrus (RSFG) and right inferior frontal gyrus
(RIFG) remained active without the report, suggesting that these
areas may still be causally involved in perceptual transitions
(Sterzer and Kleinschmidt, 2007; Weilnhammer et al., 2013).
This possibility, however, remains disputed at this point (Knapen
et al., 2011; Weilnhammer et al., 2013; Brascamp et al., 2015),
and a recent study pinpoints the RIFG as a salient event detector
rather than an executive controller (Hampshire et al., 2010).
In conclusion, we agree with the notion, emphasized
by Safavi and colleagues, that the field of consciousness
research will benefit from an integrated view of evidence from
various experimental and neuroscientific paradigms (Aru and
Bachmann, 2015). Future research on consciousness will also
benefit from careful distinction of the exact roles of different
frontal lobe areas (Zaretskaya and Narinyan, 2014). Here we add
to that the importance of a careful distinction between various
processes and mechanisms that together contribute to conscious
experience.
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